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Interview




Interview with William W. Freehling
Interviewed by Christopher Childers
Civil War Book Review (CWBR): The two volumes of Road to Disunion
constitute a grand narrative history not often seen in recent historical
writing. What compelled you to write the history of secession in this way?
William W. Freehling (WWF): I relish a good story, whether in a novel or
in a history. Some historical material is not best explained through storytelling.
But an epic event such as secession is perfect for this literary form.
The epic narrative style is also perfect for the second audience that I covet. I
cherish my scholarly readers. But I also wish to interest the so-called general
readersùthe cultivated citizens who have no academic training in history but love
accessible renditions of historical lessons. History, to repeat my tritest (but
truest) phrasing of the case for scholarly reach, is too important to be reserved
for historians. The tale of secession bears civic lessons that are important for
non-Civil War historians: the capacity of racism to distort democracy, the danger
that cries of traitor can close democratic discourse, the power of minorities to
control majorities, the fact that republican government is not always capable of
thrivingùnot even here, arrogant Americans need to learn, not to provide
peaceful solutions for our gravest domestic problems in the nineteenth century.
Anytime I can clothe vital lessons in sophisticated stories that attract
nonacademics as well as academics, I call it a good day's work.
CWBR: Approximately sixteen years have passed since the first volume 
of The Road to Disunion appeared. Did your views on how the war came
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change in any way between your completion of Volume 1 and 2?
WWF: When I wrote volume 1, I thought that the pre-1854 events set off
irresistible trends that would inevitably lead to disunion and war after Lincoln's
election. While I still think that those trends existed and powerfully continued, I
have come to think that disunion need not necessarily have come precisely when
it did or exactly in the way that it did. While the nation's ability to deal with the
slavery issue peacefully had deteriorated significantly by 1860, there were still
ways out of a civil war at that time. I now put more stress on personalities,
contingencies, and coincidences in explaining why the descent into war at that
time overcame the other possibilities. As to whether some kind of civil war was
very probable at some time, thanks to the worsening trends that started way back
in 1776ùwell, I still think that. So volume 1 was not in vain!
CWBR: You emphasize personal forces, or the actions of individual
people in shaping antebellum southern history. How did the actions of
southern political leaders influence the outcome of the sectional crisis?
WWF: I think the shrewdness or shortcomings of many leaders had much to
do with happenings during the last year before the war, including William L.
Yancey's clever tactics at the Charleston National Democratic Party Convention,
Robert Gourdin's and John Townsend's superb manipulations in Charleston at
secessionists' moment of breakthrough, Alexander Stephens's and James Henry
Hammond's dismal performances at crunch time for the so-called Unionists, and
Winfield Scott's blunders in regards to Lincoln's orders to reinforce Fort Pickens
(the details of that last story will be in my forthcoming Lincoln book). Each of
these episodes comes replete with unforgettable characters, stirring scenes,
illustrious places, and fabulous photographsùperfect for a narrative history.
CWBR: You describe The Road to Disunion II as mainstream political
history, a mode of historical inquiry that once dominated the field, but that
social and cultural history has recently challenged. In your search for fresh
angles in the historical record, what was the most glaring omission you
found among older works that you have uncovered in this book?
WWF: Many things that are new in my book can be found in bits and pieces 
of older narratives, especially David Potter's wonderful The Impending Crisis. 
But these clues are submerged; I need to display them afresh and in new 
contexts. As for the monographs that specialists have written since folks wrote
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the big Civil War synthesesùthey often tell important pieces of the story, but not
usually as a story, and not usually in the context of other and bigger stories. In
storytelling as in politics, context is king. And then too there are some important
stories that I found in no other scholar's account, not even in bits and pieces,
including a full-blown conspiracy to seize all Lower South forts before any state
except South Carolina had seceded, in response to James Buchanan's Star of the
West--a series of military events that bore on decisions to secede.
CWBR: In your coda to the final chapter of The Road to Disunion II,
you ask how did slavery cause the Civil War and cite contingency, or the
effects of personality, accidents, and timingùto use your wordsùas a major
factor in how the war came and why it came in 1861. How did contingencies
set the course of the eight years leading up to the Civil War?
WWF: The big coincidence was the Charleston and Savannah Railroad's
celebration on just the right day and with just the right people in attendanceùthe
only way to explain South Carolina's critical transformation from November 9 to
10, 1860. There isn't space here to retell that incredible tale, so let me take a
simpler example. In my judgment, John Brown's impact came not just from his
raid but also from his speech to his judges and from the resulting northern
hurrahs for his words, so infuriating to the Southrons. Brown could have easily
been killed rather than wounded when Lee's men assaulted him in the Harpers
Ferry engine house. The coincidence that he was but wounded had nothing to do
with the slavery issue's remorseless trendsùand everything to do with his ability
to give the speech that largely forged his influence on events.
CWBR: The last historian to write a synthetic history of the South's
road to disunion was revisionist historian Avery O. Craven, the author of
The Coming of the Civil War and The Growth of Southern Nationalism,
1848-1861. Craven and other revisionists labeled the men of the antebellum
years as a blundering generation. Given your emphasis on personalities and
individuals in setting the course of disunion, did southern leaders blunder
their way into civil war?
WWF: Certainly the secessionists blundered by triumphing, given that they 
thought their crusade offered the best way to save slavery! There is an overriding 
suicidal irony to this tale. So too, certainly blunders helped the secessionists 
along, include Scott's in re Fort Pickens, Buchanan's in regards to the Dred Scott 
Case and the Star of the West, and Stephens's-Hammond's abject failure at
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mounting a viable unionist' campaign. But I see no worse blunders in this period
than in any other, and as I have said, the slavery issue likely would have caused
some sort of civil war, sometime, even if the most enlightened leaders had
always been in command. The big task is to explain why the slavery issue was so
difficult to resolve peacefully, even without any blunders.
CWBR: You devote a sizable portion of The Road to Disunion II to the
Bleeding Kansas debacle. Why did Kansas become the contested ground for
the expansion of slavery and how did the struggle for a free or slave Kansas
Territory resonate throughout the years leading up to the Civil War?
WWF: The Kansas turmoil stretched over the perfect time to be critical
chronologically. The bloody affair convulsed the time between the illusory
armistice called the Compromise of 1850 and the inflamed presidential campaign
that anointed Lincoln.
The Kansas turmoil also stretched over the perfect place to be important
geographically. The showdown occurred in the Border South region, where
slavery had shallowest roots, and more specifically across the Missouri River
from the western Missouri slaveholders, whose stake in the institution faced
greatest siege. To acquiesce in a free soil Kansas, neighboring Missouri rednecks
thought, was to accept external incendiary assaults hard by their firesides. The
result, they conceived, could only be the shrinkage of slavery from Missouri and
then from the entire Border South.
To repel this supposed mortal threat, western Missourians, led by U. S.
Senator Atchison, insisted that Kansas be open to slaveholding settlers, then
insisted that the territory bar free soil agitation, then insisted that the barely
enslaved territory be admitted to the Union as a slave state. The embittered
minority succeeded in everything except the admission of enslaved Kansasùand
there the slaveholders barely lost.
This four years of political combat, streaked with bloodshed, violence, and 
colorful combatants, invite epic storytelling. More important, like the best tales, 
the long confrontation illuminates the most cutting abstractions. The Kansas 
turmoil illustrates one of my central themes in Road, one that illuminates many 
trails in democracy's history besides the path to secessionùthe way a minority 
controls majoritarian processes. Just as only the western Missouri minority of the 
southern minority at first considered a showdown in Kansas crucial, so only the
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Lower South (and especially South Carolina) fragment of the southern minority
at first considered President-elect Abraham Lincoln an immediate menace to
slavery. In both cases, historians' intellectual adventure is to explain why the first
hotspot raged while cooler regions but fretted, then to explain why the blaze
spread in the South and ultimately to the nation.
The slaveholders' temporary Kansas triumph also illuminates a recurring
human happeningùthe way victories can have unintended consequences that
become suicidal to the victors. The fleeting triumph of the secessionists is of
course the best Civil War example of how winners can establish conditions for
their fastest possible destruction. So too, by insisting on the Kansas-Nebraska
Act and then by establishing the most despotic slave codes anywhere in the
South in territorial Kansas, the western Missourians set the stage for the
almost-victory of the Republicans in the presidential contest of 1856.
Subsequently, the almost-victory of the South in the 1858 Lecompton
controversy, with the admission of (barely) enslaved Kansas at stake, set the
stage for the Republicans' mammoth gains in the 1858 congressional elections
and their march to the White House in 1860.
The South's empty fleeting victory in Kansas illuminates the frustration of
the pre-secession southern extremistsùand one of their central fears, that slavery
in the Border South, like slavery in the Border North in the Founding Fathers'
days, possessed too little staying power. The ultimate question, in Kansas as in
all the other antebellum hotspots, was whether dictatorship over blacks could be
reconciled with majoritarianism for whites. When both sections came away from
Kansas wondering all the more, a civil war was closer.
CWBR: In this book, you articulate a theme that reveals internal
conflicts between the Border South and the Lower South, a concept you first
explored in The South Vs. The South: How Anti-Confederate Southerners
Shaped the Course of the Civil War. How did Border Southerners shape the
course of secession?
WWF: As in Kansas and its neighbor Missouri, almost all the pre-War 
controversies began with borderland proslavery warriors fighting a rearguard 
action against the turtle-slow waning of slavery in their northern South region. In 
the climactic secession crisis, the first disunionists stormed that President-elect 
Lincoln would use his control over federal patronage to start a Southern 
Republican Party in this least southern South (and would encourage fugitive
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slaves to pass over an increasingly porous border and further weaken the South's
northern hinterlands; here as throughout the pre-War and wartime epics, the
heroics of fugitive slaves showed the impact of blacks on whites' politicalùand
militaryùprocesses).
Lincoln, as so often, put it bestùI hope to have God on my side, but I must
have Kentucky. The more southern South's convulsive, ultimately
counterproductive efforts to keep Kentucky (and Missouri, Maryland, Delaware,
western Virginia, and eastern Tennessee) on its side had much to do with how
the war cameùand in the characteristic ironies of this epicùmuch to do with how
the war turned out.
CWBR: Your analysis of the secession winter of 1860-1861 comprises a
third of the book. How did personalities and contingencies shape the course
of the secession process in the South? Why did the southern states begin
seceding after Lincoln's election?
WWF: I believe that the railroad coincidence, mentioned above, had much
to do with South Carolina's gaining the nerve to go it at first alone. Then I think
that James Buchanan's (arguably blundering) decision to send the Star of the
West had some impact in making sure that South Carolina would not stand alone.
Furthermore, the personalities of the South Carolinians who took over the
revolutionùmost of them little known or unknownùhad much to do with soothing
the initial secessionists, just as the personalities of Alexander Stephens and
James Hammond had much to do with (and illustrated ) the lame resistance of
the Lower South's opponents of instant disunion. (A great book needs to be
written on that Unionist lameness.)
As to why initial secessionists did it, my largest generalization would be that
the South's most enslaved, most reactionary region, the South Carolina
lowcountry, harbored a peculiar contempt for mobocratic nineteenth century
two-party politics, with its alleged demagogues supposedly fooling the gullible
public and thus gaining the loaves and fishes of office. South Carolina oligarchs
climactically focused on President-elect Lincoln's potential use of patronage to
establish a Southern Republican Party in the borderlands. But this oligarchic
logic about why Lincoln was an immediate menace was only part of the story.
Also involved was the honor of a state that had often pledged to nullify or to
secede, and then had shamefully (so it thought) cowered. Here the analytical
categories of Kenneth Greenburg, Joanne Freeman, and Bertram Wyatt-Brown,
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when given a fresh context, gain heightened value.
CWBR: You explain how a series of errors led to the showdown at Fort
Sumter in South Carolina rather than Fort Pickens in Florida. How would
circumstances have been different with a confrontation at Fort Pickens?
WWF: Contingency analysisùbased on the conviction that little things
outside the main trends can provide a context that deflects the big
thingsùbecomes tricky at exactly such points as the Fort Pickens story. Can we
say that without the little things, the big bang would necessarily not have
happened? No way! We can only say that without the little things, the big things
would have coursed in a slightly different way and that one possibility is that the
different course would have yielded a wildly different result.
Thus I think that if human errors (especially Winfield Scott's) had not
defeated Lincoln's brilliant plan to refortify Fort Pickens and then possibly to
withdraw from Fort Sumter, the Civil War might have started in a different way
(and in a way less congenial to the Confederacy's need to gain the Upper South).
So too, I think that the war might not have started so swiftly, and even might not
have started in 1861, and even might never have started over this particular
secession situation.
The Confederates, for example, probably could never have conquered a
refortified Fort Pickens. (After all, they never did during the Civil War.) Thus
Lincoln might not have had to issue his proclamation of April 15, calling up
75,000 m n to put down the revolution that had triumphed at Fort Sumter.
Without bloodshed at Fort Sumter and Lincoln's proclamation, different
historical scenarios might have evolved.
But one can never be sure about a history that never happened. Contingency
only helps explain why history developed the way it did, not whether history
would have necessarily leapt in another direction. I explain all this is my book in
a long coda on the railroad coincidence, and I'm now writing a longer essay on
the tricky phenomenon.
CWBR: As a historian with an interest in writing narrative history, how
do you craft your books to engage your audience? What presented the
greatest challenge in writing The Road to Disunion II in an engaging style?
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WWF: I use visual material, especially maps and photographs, to illustrate
my words. For example, my cartographer, David Fuller, working with my goals
in mind, has drawn a brilliant original map of the comparative situations at Forts
Pickens and Fort Sumter, one that can help readers see at a glance what was
involved in Lincoln's first fort strategy. So too, the magnificent, very rare
pictures of John Townsend and Alexander Stephens can help readers instantly
see why secessionists' and anti-secessionists' personalities vitally mattered.
But ultimately, words must tell my tale. I endeavor to follow the journalistic
rules of accessible popular writing: avoid sleepy passive verbs and excess verbal
baggage, seek shorter paragraphs, and slimmer sentences, and pithier words,
eliminate academic jargon and find words that nonexperts can instantly
recognize.
In addition, I have sought to reserve the text only for words that propel my
tale. The important words that only fellow academics need, about for example
how my story varies from or feeds on other scholars' tales, are reserved for the
notes. So too, I have tried to minimize abstract historical theory when telling
stories; abstruse explanations, when important for all readers and not just fellow
scholars, are placed in codas, after the stories have been related. The after words
seek a reader's rethinking at a deeper level about the textual rendezvous just
experienced.
I have also tried to clothe abstractions with verbal portraits of people, places,
and confrontations. For example, I start the book with a prologue on William L.
Yancey. I thereby seek to give a crucial abstract themeùthe South's hatred of
Yankee holier-than-thousùthe human form of an Alabama stepson's loathing for
his Yankee stepfather. Some of my favorite pages in the book are of this sort.
For example, the Kentucky anti-slavery preacher John G. Fee's anguish over his
Mammy illuminates the abstract problems that ate at the evangelical Christian
argument for slavery.
The shortcomings of these tactics include the sometimes-absence of enough
material in the sources to paint portraits of the people involved in the abstraction
and the sometimes abstruse weight of the abstractions that obsessed folk at the
time. Thus a few of my pages are not easy reading. But I cannot eliminate ideas
crucial to the antebellum southerners because they are hard for modern readers to
comprehend. I have to trust my readers to keep going at the occasional tough
spots where portraiture cannot illustrate the abstruse. Fortunately, the most
8
Civil War Book Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cwbr/vol9/iss2/1
abstract pages occur in the middle of the book, and the whole last third is full of
vivid people and striking scenes.
My objectives and methods here are very similar to those of academic
scholars when seeking a popular audience in their lecture rooms. To interest our
students, we must render the abstractions that are vital to our fellow scholars in
an engaging style congenial to nonscholars. The best lecturers in no way cheapen
their abstractions by finding colorful ways to illustrate sophisticated ideas. Why
should it be any different with our books, especially with a lush literary form, the
epic narrative, begging to be used?
CWBR: Thank you.
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